This paper examines how rm nancial policy impacts investment in workplace safety. The agency theory of capital structure hypothesizes that the use of corporate debt can have a signicant impact on the rm's non-nancial stakeholders such as its employees. Using plant-level data on employee injuries from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, this paper tests whether rm leverage and nancial condition impact future injury rates at the rm. Controlling for a number of factors (including year × industry and establishment xed eects), we nd evidence that rms with higher nancial leverage invest less in workplace safety than rms with low leverage. Using an exogenous change in tax law surrounding the repatriation of foreign prots as a natural experiment, we show that this investment is directly related to available cash ows. We also nd that the relationship between injury rates and leverage is stronger for establishments located in more union-intensive states, suggesting that leverage attenuates the eects of employee bargaining power on workplace safety.
Introduction
The agency theory of capital structure has long emphasized the indirect costs of debt resulting from its propensity to create or exacerbate conicts among a rm's stakeholders. The * Jonathan Cohn: jonathan.cohn@mccombs.utexas.edu (512) 232-6827. Malcolm Wardlaw: malcolm.wardlaw@utdallas.edu (972) 883-5903. We would like to thank Sheridan Titman and seminar participants at the University of Texas at Dallas for their comments, and Nicole Nestoriak from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for her assistance with the injury data. majority of research on these indirect costs of debt focuses on conicts between shareholders and creditors and/or between shareholders and managers. However, a rm's nancial policies also potentially aect other stakeholders in the rm, including its customers, employees and suppliers (Titman, 1984) . In spite of the potential importance of conicts between these non-nancial stakeholders and the rm's nancial stakeholders (especially equity holders), there is little empirical research studying indirect costs of debt arising from its eect on these types of conicts.
In this paper, we examine how debt aects one particular set of decisions that impact the well-being of a rm's employees. Specically, we use plant-level data on employee injuries to examine how a rm's debt load impacts its investment in workplace safety. Controlling for a number of factors, we nd a positive relation between a rm's nancial leverage and injury rates at the rm. These results suggest that rms invest less in workplace safety when they have more debt and greater pressure on the use of internal cash ows. Our results as a whole shed new light on the way in which ex-ante nancing decisions impact non-nancial stakeholders.
Contracts between a rm and its various stakeholders are inherently incomplete. This incompleteness can be especially severe when it comes to investments that a rm makes in maintenance, training, and supervision that aect workplace safety. While the rm is bonded by safety requirements and work rules negotiated by employees, employee unions, and government regulators, these rules cannot fully specify the level of attention paid to investments in overall workplace safety. Moreover, since labor representatives and government regulators do not have the resources to fully observe working conditions, the rm is able to exert some discretion over its investments in workplace safety.
Theory suggests that rms may invest less in employee safety when they have more debt in their capital structure for two reasons. First, since interest payments reduce a rm's investable resources, a rm with more debt may be unwilling or unable to invest in safety at the same level that a rm with less debt would. Consistent with this argument, the nancing constraints literature largely concludes that rms invest less in capital assets and research and development when they have less available cash. Second, rms with more debt are more likely to go bankrupt, and any long-run returns to the rm from investing in safety will accrue to creditors rather than current shareholders in the event of bankruptcy.
While we cannot observe a rm's investment in employee safety directly, we can observe the outcome of this investment: the frequency with which its employees are injured on the job. We obtain annual plant-level survey data from the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that includes number of injuries, average number of employees, and total hours worked. To assess the eects of debt on investments in employee safety, we examine the relation between the frequency of injuries at an establishment and the nancial leverage of its parent company at the beginning of the year. We nd a positive relation using several dierent models, and controlling for a number of rm characteristics, including industry × year dummies to account for variation in injury rates within industries over time and a xed-eects Poisson model controlling for all cross sectional variation at the establishment level. This relation is economically signicant, with a 10% increase in leverage translating into an approximately 4% increase in injury rate. Injury rates are also higher when rms are smaller and when rm-level sales growth is high, suggesting that injuries are more common in faster-growing rms. However, injury rates are also higher for rms with lower rm level capital expenditures, suggesting that investment in workplace safety is correlated with investment in other areas.
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that, even with all of the controls that we employ, some omitted variable drives the relation we observe between injury rates and leverage. In order to establish constrained cash ow as a channel through which this relationship is generated, we use a 2004 tax holiday on foreign prot repatriation as a quasi-natural experiment. In 2004, The American Jobs Creation Act created a temporary tax holiday that eectively reduced the U.S. tax rate on repatriations from foreign subsidiaries from 35 percent to 5.25 percent. As demonstrated in previous studies, this allowed rms to repatriate a signicant amount of cash from overseas. Using this tax holiday as a plausibly exogenous change in the availability of cash, we show that the establishments of rms with positive cumulative foreign prots in the three years prior to the act saw a substantial decline in injury rates after 2004 relative to those of rms with zero or negative overseas prots.
1 Moreover, this decline was most signicant among rms with higher leverage.
We also examine how employee bargaining power interacts with capital structure to impact workplace safety using a measure of state-level union intensity. If employee bargaining power attenuates the adverse eects of leverage on employee safety, we should nd that the relationship between injury rates and leverage weakens with unionization. However, if increasing the amount of cash ow committed to creditors weakens the ability of employee empowerment to induce rms to invest in workplace safety, the relationship should instead strengthen. Our results support this latter hypothesis.
Since the early work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) , researchers have emphasized how incomplete contracts between nancial stakeholders give rise to an agency cost of debt. Titman (1984) extended this idea to illustrate how such agency costs necessarily extend to other stakeholders with whom the rm must contract, in particular its customers, suppliers, and workers. While a large empirical literature has sought to identify the impact of agency frictions on rm decisions and the value of its nancial claims, less attention been paid to the real impact on these non-nancial stakeholders. Rose (1990) and Dionne, Gagné, Gagnon, and Vanasse (1997) examine how the nancial 1 Note that all of the establishments in our sample are located in the United States. condition of rms may inuence customer and employee well-being by examining serious operating accidents in the airline industry in the U.S. and Canada respectively. They nd that operating margins are negatively correlated with the likelihood of accidents, and Dionne, Gagné, Gagnon, and Vanasse (1997) nd some evidence that beginning of period debt levels impact the likelihood of accident but only for carriers with negative equity. In a similar estimation, Beard (1992) studies a small sample of trucking companies and nds that roadside inspection violations are decreasing in equity valuation. These studies, however are limited to a small handful of rms in specic industries and have little to say about the direct impact of leverage on employee safety.
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The closest work to ours is a study by Filer and Golbe (2003) , which examine 1,065 OSHA safety inspections at 255 rms from 1972 to 1987 and estimates the occurrence of serious inspection violations as a function of the nancial condition of the rm. They nd that rms with higher operating margins and higher debt levels have fewer predicted violations. Thus their results on leverage are the opposite of ours. We note though that their sample period diers from ours and that they measure only violations occurring from program inspections and not the actual real outcomes (i.e., injuries) that we measure. Moreover, fewer than 30% of inspections report any violations at all, and the sparse nature of their data does not allow Filer and Golbe (2003) to control for time trends.
Our study is also related to the empirical literature on nancing frictions and rm employment decisions. Gordon (1998) , for instance, show that higher rm debt levels are associated with reductions in employment levels which are not fully attributable to performance, while Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009) show that rms with more entrenched managers tend to pay their workers more. In a recent working paper, Benmelech, 2 In a theoretical model, Beard (1990) explores the theoretical link between the asymmetric payo of bankruptcy costs and worker care, demonstrating that such a relationship can result in either underinvestment or over-investment in safety. As such, it is an empirical question whether greater debt usage results in an underinvestment in workplace safety for the majority of rms. Bergman, and Seru (2011) attempt to measure the importance of nancing constraints on rm employment decisions. Using several dierent approaches, they show that employment levels are sensitive to free cash ow and that this sensitivity is greater for rms with higher leverage. Our study also complements the literature on capital structure and labor bargaining, including work by Bronars and Deere (1991) and Matsa (2010) showing that rms appear to use nancial leverage in order to gain bargaining power over their unions. Finally, our paper contributes to the overall literature on nancing constraints pioneered by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) . The act was intended to spur domestic U.S. investment by relaxing nancing constraints faced by multinational rms, with the hope that this would lead to the creation of additional U.S. jobs. The amount of funds repatriated under the act was considerable ($312 billion according to IRS data). However, there is disagreement about how these funds were ultimately used. While the act required that repatriated funds be used only for certain types of domestic investment, funds in a company are fungible and repatriated funds may have been substituted for existing domestic funds without resulting in additional investment. Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) nd no evidence that repatriated funds led to increased capital investment, research and development, or employment in the U.S. Blouin and Krull (2009) nd that rms repatriating funds under the act had high free cash ow and poor investment opportunities and were therefore unlikely to have been nancially-constrained.
Both of these papers conclude that the majority of funds repatriated were eectively paid out to shareholders through share repurchases. Using a dierent approach, however, Faulkender and Petersen (2011) nd that capital-constrained rms did use repatriated funds to invest in physical assets in the U.S. Our study concludes that the increase in available cash posi-tively impacted a dierent form of investment, specically investment in workplace safety, especially among rms that were highly-leveraged and therefore more likely to have been nancially constrained.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides an outline of the main tests and presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. The data naturally presents itself as count data which we model in two ways. Using a negative binomial model, we rst model the count directly as an unadjusted integer value.
Second, we compute two separate measurers of establishment-level injury rates: cases per hour and cases per (average) employee. We pre-multiply the cases per hour measure by 1,000 in all of the analysis that follows to make these numbers easier to report. We use cases per hour as our primary injury rate measure, since hours represent the best measure of the quantity of time employees spend working and therefore facing the possibility of injury. We also treat hours worked as the primary exposure variable in our count models. Conclusions of our analysis are similar when using average employees as the exposure. Table 1 To get a sense of the relative variation of injury occurrence in our sample, we report the between and within variation for three groups. Table 3 lists the variance breakdown grouped by establishment, rm, and industry. This provides a reference for the relative dierences in injury occurrence in the cross section and the time series, as well as the within and between variation according to rm and industry. The within standard deviation at the establishment level is approximately one third that of the between and overall standard deviation. This suggests that the unconditional dierences are much greater across establishments than over time for the same establishment. This makes identication from a pure time series model somewhat dicult, though the the variation at least appears to be of a similar magnitude.
Sample
The within rm variation is much larger, suggesting that there may be substantial variation from establishment to establishment within the same rm. Since the between rm variation is actually smaller, this suggests there may be substantial heterogeneity within the establishments at the same rm adding noise to estimations which involve regressors that are constant across rm year groups.
An interesting and useful feature of the data is the identication of industry at the establishment level rather than the rm level. This allows us to assign each establishment a unique industry rather than pooling them over a potentially inaccurate rm level industry classication. This may serve to control for some of the unconditional variation from establishment to establishment when using rm eects. We see signicant variation within each industry, at a level close to the overall variation.
Finally, Figure 1 depicts average injury rates by parent rm Standard & Poor's credit rating. A few of the credit rating classications are combined because the number of rms in these classications is small (less than ten). Each bar in the gure represents the average injury rate for establishments belonging to parent rms in one credit rating classication.
While the pattern is noisy, there is a clear upward trend in injury rates as one moves from more highly-rated companies on the left to less-highly rated companies on the right. Indeed, if we treat the credit rating data as cardinal and t a regression line to the data presented in Figure 1 , the slope of the line (depicted in the gure) is positive and statistically dierent from zero at the one percent level, with a t-statistic of 3.64. Since credit rating is largely a function of nancial leverage, this suggests a positive relation between leverage and injury rates. The next section, which presents the paper's main results, explores this relation in detail.
Results
This section presents the paper's main results. We rst examine the relationship between injury rates and capital structure, controlling for a number of rm-level characteristics. We then examine changes in injury rates around a 2004 repatriation tax holiday, depending on whether or not a rm had foreign prots that it could have repatriated. Finally, we examine how employee bargaining power and capital structure interact to impact injury rates.
Injury rates and capital structure
We begin our analysis with a series of establishment-year level count models. Since we suspect the data is likely to be over-dispersed, we will rst employ a series of negative binomial models. The negative binomial model employed is a generalization of the standard Poisson model, in which the mean has a degree of over-dispersion. Specically:
The model relaxes the standard Poisson assumption that λ = E(λ) = Var(λ), and it provides a direct method for testing the presence of over-dispersion by testing the signicance of α. These tests show a high degree of over-dispersion. One limitation of this model, however, is that it cannot readily accommodate establishment xed eects. Thus it cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity at the establishment level that aects both injury rates and capital structure. The Poisson model, on the other hand, can account for such xed eects. We therefore also estimate a xed eects Poisson model in which the the arrival rate parameter λ i,t has a xed component for every establishment such that:
In addition to being unable to allow for over-dispersion, which may signicantly harm eciency if the data is over-dispersed, this xed eects Poisson model also requires that an establishment have at least two (and possibly more) unique observations for it to be used in the estimation, which reduces the available sample size.
Count Model Results
The results of these initial tests are presented in Table 4 . The dependent variable in each model is the number of reported injuries for an establishment-year. The rst column reports the results with lagged book leverage as the only explanatory variable, along with individual year dummies to control for the time trend. The exposure variable is total hours worked at the establishment. The coecient on lagged book leverage is positive and statistically signicant, consistent with the argument that rms with greater debt burdens invest less in workplace safety.
In the second column, we add several control variables to account for other observable characteristics that might be correlated with injury rates. These control variables, all measured at the rm level, are the natural log of sales, the natural log of lagged total assets, lagged market-to-book ratio, lagged tangible assets, and investment/assets. The coecient on lagged book leverage is reduced in magnitude, but actually increases slightly in statistical signicance. The coecient on sales growth is positive and statistically signicant at the one percent level as well. Thus, once we control for other observable characteristics that are likely to be correlated with injury rates, we nd evidence consistent with higher injury rates at rms that are growing more rapidly. This is consistent with an emphasis in growth leading to a less safe work environment.
The third column is the same as the second, except that we add establishment level industry dummies as explanatory variables, where we dene industries using Fama and
French's 48 industry classications. Controlling for industry is important, since both injury rates and nancial statement measures are likely to vary in systematic ways across industries.
The results in the third column show that the coecient on book leverage changes only slightly when we include industry dummies in the regression, and it remains statistically signicant at the one percent level. Adding industry dummies attenuates the coecient on tangible assets but does not materially alter the coecient on leverage, which suggests that our controls are eectively capturing the impact of variation in book leverage which is orthogonal to industry specic debt capacity characteristics.
The fourth column is identical to the previous one except that the exposure variable has been changed from hours worked to average number of employees. Changing the primary exposure variable does not materially change any of the coecients. In all four models presented so far, the alpha parameter is highly statistically signicant, indicating that the data is over-dispersed. This suggests that a negative binomial model is likely to be more appropriate than a Poisson model.
The last column reports the coecients from a xed-eects Poisson model. In this model, the injury arrival rate is assumed to have a xed component which is dierent for every individual establishment. Similar to a linear xed-eects model, this model controls for all time invariant factors which impact the injury rate at the establishment level, identifying the remaining coecients o time series variation in the data. This has the advantage of controlling for all cross sectional variation that may be due to inherent dierences in the way a company operates, and by extension the impact that this variation has on leverage choice.
Unfortunately, estimation of the likelihood does not allow us to account for over-dispersion, resulting in a marked decline in eciency. In spite of this, column ve gives a coecient estimate on book leverage which is markedly similar to the coecient in the previous three models and is still statistically signicant at the 5% level. The other coecients remain similar as well, with the notable exception of log(assets) and tangible assets. This seems to indicate that these eects are primarily driven by residual cross-sectional variation in the previous models which is not present in the xed-eects specication.
The economic magnitude of these results can be interpreted by transforming the coefcient into an incidence rate ratio e β . Since β is the dierence in the log of the expected counts, the exponential gives the percentage increase in the expected count for a unit increase in the independent variable. The coecient on leverage in columns (3) and (4) correspond to an incidence rate ratio of 1.39 and 1.42, respectively. Therefore, a dierence in rm leverage of 10% of assets corresponds to a roughly 4% increase in the annual accident rate (10% × (1.4 -1)). For comparison, the average predicted number of injuries per year evaluated at the median leverage is equal to 14.1 under model (3). Keeping all else equal, an establishment belonging to a rm with leverage at the 90th percentile (0.538) would have 15.9 predicted injuries per year, or slightly less than 2 more injuries per year than a rm at the median.
Tobit Model Results
In addition to our count models, we also estimate specications using injury rates (injuries divided by hours or employees). For these tests, we use a Tobit model to account for the large clustering of zeros in the data which would otherwise bias a simple linear model. In this model, we treat the target mean injury rate as a latent variable which is censored at zero. Errors in the model represent unforeseen deviations in the target, and the target is eectively censored by the fact that negative errors cannot drive the observed injury rate below zero. This also helps deal with the fact that employees cannot be fractionally injured, which would otherwise create a bias in establishments with few employees.
The results of this Tobit specication is presented in Table 5 , with the dependent variable being the injury rate in each year, scaled by either hours worked or average employees as noted. The rst three columns mirror the results from the negative binomial models, with lagged book leverage entering the equation as signicant in all specications. The fourth column adds an additional set of controls for year × industry dummies, eectively allowing for every industry to have its own individual time trend. This additional restriction does not materially change the coecient estimates. This set of controls demonstrates that we are not picking up a set of cross section-specic time trends and that the impact of rm leverage on injury rates is indeed orthogonal to any structural changes in industry makeup over the period.
Column ve presents a similar model using average number of employees as the denominator rather than total hours. The results are similar to the previous specications, and the coecients all remain signicant at the 1 % level. 
Tax Driven Prot Repatriation
One obvious concern about the results in Tables 4 and 5 is that leverage may proxy for management quality, industry conditions, or other factors that could also be correlated with injury rates. While the fact that the coecient on lagged book leverage remains statistically signicant after controlling for a number of other variables as well as industry, year × industry, and establishment xed eects in various specications, we seek further verication that we are fully identifying the channel through which leverage is related to injury rates.
We do so by appealing to a quasi-natural experiment surrounding a 2004 tax holiday which allowed rms to repatriate foreign prots at a drastically reduced tax rate.
As part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the U.S. Congress allowed corporations with foreign subsidiaries to repatriate foreign earned income at a rate of just 5.25%, with an eective tax rate as low as 3.7%, down from the standard corporate tax rate of 35%.
The act had a signicant impact on the total amount of cash repatriated for use in domestic operations. While the act was intended to spur new domestic investment, the evidence that rms actually funded new capital investment with these funds is mixed. What is clear however, is that rms did see a large inow of funds from overseas subsidiaries as a direct result of the tax holiday.
We use ex-ante variation in available foreign prots prior to the 2004 act as a measure of cash available to be repatriated from foreign subsidiaries during the tax holiday. If the relationship between leverage and injury rates is the result of hard budget constraint issues, the unexpected availability of cash from foreign subsidiaries should attenuate this eect.
Specically, rms with foreign prots in the years prior to the act should see a decline in injury rates immediately after the act relative to rms lacking such prots. Moreover, there should also be a conditional eect whereby rms with signicant foreign prots should see an attenuation of the impact of leverage on injury rates, since the servicing of existing debt claims is made easier by the presence of repatriated foreign prots.
The tests we propose are a non-linear analogue to a dierences-in-dierences specication in a linear model. We gather injury and nancial data from the two years before ( Table 6 .
The rst column in Table 6 reports the baseline results of the negative binomial model.
The negative coecient on the Post-2004 indicator variable indicates that the mean injury
arrival rate has fallen across the board in the post 2004 period. The similarly negative coefcient on positive foreign prots indicates that rms with positive foreign prots experience 3 Our choice of both the period over which to calculate foreign prots and the period over which to measure cumulative foreign prots are arbitrary. We chose two years on either side of the tax change to focus on a narrow window around the time of the tax change while still allowing for the possibility that some time is required for investment in workplace safety to translate into observable changes in injury rates. We chose to cumulate foreign prots over three years before the tax change to have a large enough window to reliably measure recent foreign protability while still avoiding foreign prots from the distant past that may no longer reside in a foreign subsidiary. Our results are robust to alternative windows around the tax change and alternative windows for cumulating foreign prots. lower overall injury rates. The interaction of the two variables demonstrates that rms with ex-ante foreign prots see an even larger decrease in injury rates after the tax act than those with no available prots to repatriate.
A large group of additional controls are added in column two to control for additional rm characteristics which might inuence injury rates. It is interesting to note that the coecient on positive foreign prots is no longer signicant in this specication, suggesting that the additional controls may proxy for the rm specic traits which caused rms with foreign prots to have lower injury rates in column one. The coecient on the interaction be- 
Union Intensity and Injury Rates
We next examine how employee bargaining power and leverage interact in determining rms' investments in workplace safety. One possibility is that employee bargaining power attenuates the negative eects of leverage on employee safety. For example, suppose that rms substitute investment away from employee safety and to other uses as cash becomes more scarce due to a higher debt service requirement. Employees endowed with more bargaining power are better positioned to resist such disinvestment in safety. In this case, the injury rate should increase with leverage less in rms where employees have more bargaining power. Consider a regression of a measure of injuries on leverage, a measure of bargaining power, and the interaction of the two. The argument outlined here would predict a negative coecient on the interaction term.
Another possibility is that leverage attenuates the positive eects of employee bargaining power on employee safety. Employees with more bargaining power are better positioned to resist underinvestment by rms in employee safety. By committing to pay out more cash to creditors, rms can tie their hands by limiting the amount of cash available to invest in safety. In this case, the injury rate should decrease with employee bargaining power less in rms with more leverage. Consider the regression described in the preceding paragraph. The argument here would predict a positive coecient on the interaction term in that regression.
Thus, whether bargaining power attenuates the eects of leverage or vice versa is an empirical question. To answer this question, we run regressions of the type described above.
We cannot observe bargaining power directly and must therefore use a proxy for it. Perhaps the most important source of employee bargaining power is collective bargaining. If we could observe the rate of unionization at the establishment level, we could use this as a proxy for employee bargaining power. Since we cannot, we construct a state-level measure of unionization intensity and apply this measure to all establishments located in the given state. We construct our state-level unionization intensity measure as follows. We collect annual household survey data on union membership from the Census Bureau from 2003 through 2009. This data is reported by state and industry, using the Census's own industry categories.
In principle, we could simply calculate the union membership rate for each state and use this as our measure of state-level unionization intensity. However, union membership varies across industries, and the composition of industries varies across states. This is a problem, since injury rates vary systematically across industries.
Alternatively, we could simply use the union membership rate for each state-industry cell as the measure of unionization intensity for an establishment. However, this rate is zero in many cells, and would provide a very noisy measure of union intensity. Instead, we regress union membership percentage for a given year-state-industry cell on industry and state dummies, pooling the data across all years in the sample. The state dummy coecients from this regression represent the residual state eect on unionization after removing industry eects. We use the coecient for each state dummy as the measure of that state's unionization intensity. The measure appears reasonable in the sense that it is high in states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, where unions are more active, and low in states such as Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, where unions play a smaller role.
We then regress injury measures on leverage, our state-level union intensity measure, and the interaction of the two (along with control variables) to test the two hypotheses described above. Table 7 presents the results of these tests. In the rst three columns, we estimate negative binomial count models using number of injuries reported as the dependent variable.
In the nal three columns, we estimate Tobit models using injury rate (cases per hour times 1,000) as the dependent variable. The results are consistent across all six specications. The coecient on the interaction of leverage and state union intensity is positive and statistically signicant at the one percent level in all six.
The positive coecient on the interaction of leverage and state union intensity supports the argument that leverage attenuates the eects of employee bargaining power on investment in workplace safety. However, if employee bargaining power has a positive eect on investment in workplace safety in general, we should nd a negative coecient on the main unionization intensity variable. This coecient is indeed negative in all six columns in Table   7 but is small in all six and is statistically signicant (at the ten percent level) in only one.
Our conclusion that leverage attenuates the eect of employee bargaining power is therefore tentative, and further research is required to draw rm conclusions about how the interaction of union intensity and leverage impacts workplace safety.
Conclusion
There is evidence in general that rms with higher nancial leverage invest less than rms with lower nancial leverage. Our evidence suggests that one form of investment that is aected by leverage is investment in employee safety. This represents a cost of debt that is borne, at least ex post, by a rm's employees. We nd that employee injury rates are higher in establishments of rms with more leverage. We nd supporting results in a quasi-natural experiment using potential tax repatriation resulting from the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 as an exogenous shock to investable cash ow. We also nd that leverage attenuates This table presents Cases is the number of recorded injuries for an establishment in a year. LTCases is the number of lost-time injuries recorded for an establishment in a year. Each of these injury counts is also reported per hour and per average number of employees. The per hour rates are multiplied by 1,000 to make them easier to read. Panel C shows summary statistics for the parent-level rm-year observations in our sample. Book leverage is book debt divided by book assets. Market leverage is book debt divided by the sum of book debt and the market value of equity. Sales growth is percent change in sales from the prior year. Sales are total reported sales. Assets are total reported assets. M-to-B is the rm's market-tobook ratio, dened as the ratio of the market value of its equity to the book value of its equity. The tangible asset ratio is plant, property and equipment divided by total assets. Investment/assets is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets. 
